Planetary Protection Knowledge Gap Closure Enabling Crewed Missions to Mars.

As focus for exploration of Mars transitions from current robotic explorers to development of crewed missions, it remains important to protect the integrity of scientific investigations at Mars, as well as protect the Earth's biosphere from any potential harmful effects from returned martian material. This is the discipline of planetary protection, and the Committee on Space Research (COSPAR) maintains the consensus international policy and guidelines on how this is implemented. Based on National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) and European Space Agency (ESA) studies that began in 2001, COSPAR adopted principles and guidelines for human missions to Mars in 2008. At that point, it was clear that to move from those qualitative provisions, a great deal of work and interaction with spacecraft designers would be necessary to generate meaningful quantitative recommendations that could embody the intent of the Outer Space Treaty (Article IX) in the design of such missions. Beginning in 2016, COSPAR then sponsored a multiyear interdisciplinary meeting series to address planetary protection "knowledge gaps" (KGs) with the intent of adapting and extending the current robotic mission-focused Planetary Protection Policy to support the design and implementation of crewed and hybrid exploration missions. This article describes the outcome of the interdisciplinary COSPAR meeting series, to describe and address these KGs, as well as identify potential paths to gap closure. It includes the background scientific basis for each topic area and knowledge updates since the meeting series ended. In particular, credible solutions for KG closure are described for the three topic areas of (1) microbial monitoring of spacecraft and crew health; (2) natural transport (and survival) of terrestrial microbial contamination at Mars, and (3) the technology and operation of spacecraft systems for contamination control. The article includes a KG data table on these topic areas, which is intended to be a point of departure for making future progress in developing an end-to-end planetary protection requirements implementation solution for a crewed mission to Mars. Overall, the workshop series has provided evidence of the feasibility of planetary protection implementation for a crewed Mars mission, given (1) the establishment of needed zoning, emission, transport, and survival parameters for terrestrial biological contamination and (2) the creation of an accepted risk-based compliance approach for adoption by spacefaring actors including national space agencies and commercial/nongovernment organizations.

Low-Latency Teleoperations, Planetary Protection, and Astrobiology.

Low-latency teleoperations (LLT), or "telepresence" allows for the control of almost any asset in essentially real-time and has significant potential to address potential planetary protection concerns and to enhance astrobiology exploration activities on both robotic and human missions to Mars and elsewhere in the solar system. LLT can assist with the search for extraterrestrial life and help mitigate planetary protection concerns as required by the UN Outer Space Treaty. LLT can help by allowing for real-time exploration of areas that may otherwise not be conducive to direct human contact. Crew members can search for, acquire, and robotically manipulate samples in real-time and engage in precise measurements and experiments without requiring the crew to be present in dangerous or otherwise problematic conditions or environments. LLT operations can be particularly effective in studying "Special Regions" - areas of astrobiological interest that might be adversely affected by forward contamination from humans or spacecraft contaminants during activities on Mars. Similarly, LLT can aid in addressing concerns about backward contamination that could impact mission implementation for returning Martian samples and crew to Earth.

Discovery of extra-terrestrial life: assessment by scales of its importance and associated risks.

The Rio Scale accepted by the SETI Committee of the International Academy of Astronautics in 2002 is intended for use in evaluating the impact on society of any announcement regarding the discovery of evidence of extra-terrestrial (ET) intelligence. The Rio Scale is mathematically defined using three parameters (class of phenomenon, type of discovery and distance) and a δ factor, the assumed credibility of a claim. This paper proposes a new scale applicable to announcements alleging evidence of ET life within or outside our Solar System. The London Scale for astrobiology has mathematical structure and logic similar to the Rio Scale, and uses four parameters (life form, nature of phenomenon, type of discovery and distance) as well as a credibility factor δ to calculate a London Scale index (LSI) with values ranging from 0 to 10. The level of risk or biohazard associated with a purported discovery is evaluated independently of the LSI value and may be ranked in four categories. The combined information is intended to provide a scalar assessment of the scientific importance, validity and potential risks associated with putative evidence of ET life discovered on Earth, on nearby bodies in the Solar System or in our Galaxy.

Migrating microbes and planetary protection.

Since the dawn of the space age, humans have wrestled with concerns about planetary cross-contamination. Spacecraft launched from Earth can transport hitchhiker microbes to new worlds on both robotic and crewed vehicles. As plans proceed for future life detection and human exploration missions, planetary protection considerations are again uppermost on the agendas of mission planners, and microbiologists have an important role to play.

An evaluation of the role and effectiveness of institutional biosafety committees in providing oversight and security at biocontainment laboratories.

Institutional biosafety committees (IBCs) have been charged with the oversight and review of biosafety at thousands of biocontainment labs nationwide, hundreds of which are high-level BSL-3 and BSL-4 labs. In light of the recent rapid proliferation of BSL-3 and BSL-4 facilities and the increases in research in the areas of biodefense, select agents, recombinant DNA, and synthetic biology and dual-use research, questions have been raised about whether IBCs are fulfilling their oversight responsibilities. This article reviews information on the responsibilities and expectations of IBCs as currently constituted and provides an analysis of IBC performance from survey data of hundreds of research institutions over the past several years. The findings highlight serious ongoing problems with IBCs' adherence to NIH Guidelines. This raises questions about the current voluntary governance framework as an effective system to monitor and oversee U.S. research facilities, including high-containment facilities, and their research activities. The findings strongly suggest the need for immediate improvement or replacement of the IBC system.